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Abstract 
 
This article estimates the impact of industrial concentration on market power and cost and 
then links the ensuing welfare changes to market structure characteristics using a sample of 
232 U.S. manufacturing industries. Empirical results indicate that further increases in 
concentration would enhance welfare in 70% of the industries due to widespread efficiency 
gains, although these would generally not be passed on to consumers. From a social 
standpoint, further concentration is more likely to be beneficial in industries with economies 
of size, high export intensity, which are engaged in consumer-oriented goods, face larger 
markets, and have low or moderate levels of initial concentration. 
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 When is Concentration Beneficial? Evidence from U.S. 
Manufacturing 
 
Rigoberto A. López, Elena López and Carmen Liron-Espana* 
 
1. Introduction. 
 
The conventional view that high levels of concentration yield excessive price-cost margins 
and, therefore, welfare losses, was challenged in the late 1960s by Williamson (1968) and 
more recently by Dickson and He (1997), Berger and Hannan (1998), Blair and Harrison 
(1999), Bian and McFetridge (2000), Feltovich (2001), and Focarrelli and Panetta (2003), 
among others. By considering both the price and cost changes resulting from industrial 
concentration, these authors raised the possibility that concentration could give rise to welfare 
gains. However, their studies are limited by specific market structure or conduct assumptions 
and do not establish a broader structural link between concentration and welfare 
consequences.  
 
In this article we estimate an oligopsony model that allows for price and cost changes 
from further concentration for each of 232 U.S. manufacturing industries, compute changes in 
welfare and then link them to market structure characteristics in order to assess when is further 
concentration beneficial. We find that although concentration enhances aggregate welfare in 
nearly 70% of the industries due to widespread efficiency gains, consumers lose in 64% while 
producers gain in 82% of the cases, as efficiency gains accrue mostly to the industries 
themselves. Further findings show that increases in concentration augment social welfare in 
industries which are large, have economies of size, inelastic demand functions, high export 
intensities, and have low or moderate levels of initial concentration. 
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 2. Empirical Model 
 
The econometric model draws from the work by Azzam (1997) and Lopez, Azzam, and Lirón-
España (2002). Consider n firms, each producing a homogeneous product , so that  
 is total industry output, and assume that their cost function takes a restricted 
Generalized Leontief form and that each firm chooses the output level which maximizes its 
profit function. Taking the derivative of the cost function with respect to the firm’s output and 
inputs, one obtains the firm’s marginal cost and input demand equations. Summing up these 
expressions across firms in the industry, using the market shares as weights, one obtains a 
supply relation given by 
iq
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where P is the output price; MC denotes the share-weighted marginal cost, given by  
+ ,  where are exogenous input 
prices, t denotes the state of technology, and  is the Herfindahl Index of industrial 
concentration where  is the market share. Note that the last term equals zero, a negative, 
or a positive value for constant, increasing, and decreasing economies of size, respectively, 
and thus determines the nature of the efficiency impacts of concentration. In the denominator 
of [1], 
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Clarke and Davies' (1982) collusion parameter, and PQ ln/ln ∂−∂=η  is the price elasticity 
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of demand in absolute value.  jβ , γtj and γjk )...1,( mkj = are fixed parameters to be 
estimated. 
 
Assume that the industry faces an output demand function which takes the logarithmic 
form: 
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where  is a price deflator,  denotes exogenous demand shifters, and d lZ lδδ ,0  and η  
are fixed parameters. 
 
Market equilibrium in a particular industry is reached when P  and  fulfill equations 
[1] and [2] simultaneously. Consequently, the total elasticity of price (with respect to the 
Herfindahl index (
Q
HP ,ε ) can be expressed as 
 
 ][ ,,, HCMHLHP εελε += ,       [3] 
 
which is the sum of the Lerner index elasticity )/]1[(, ηαε MCPHHL −=  and the marginal 
cost elasticity  multiplied by an equilibrium adjustment factor 
.
)/2(
1,
MCwQH jj
m
j
HMC βε ∑=
)]1( 1,
−+= HMCηελ 1  While the Lerner index elasticity is always non-negative, the marginal 
cost elasticity is positive only if there are diseconomies of size. Moreover, if there are 
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economies of size, the adjustment factor is greater than 1 and industry output tends to expand 
with further concentration. 
 
Whether a rise in concentration enhances or impairs welfare depends on market 
power and cost efficiency effects. Three relevant scenarios are: (1) price decrease with cost 
efficiency gain; (2) price increase with cost efficiency gain, and (3) price increase with cost 
efficiency loss. 
 
A total welfare standard assumes that society as a whole can potentially benefit from 
rises in concentration as long as the sum of the changes in consumer surplus and producer 
surplus is positive, as shown in Figure 1 for a rise in H from H0 to H1. The market power effect 
is represented by a downward shift in the perceived marginal revenue from MR0 to MR1, 
resulting, by itself, in a higher price. On the other hand, the increase in efficiency effect is 
represented by a downward shift in the marginal cost curve from MC0 to MC1. The change in 
consumer surplus is given by GT + , where T is a pure transfer and G is a net welfare gain. 
The change in producer surplus is given by F+E-T, where F is a change in net revenue from 
changes in output and E is the cost saving at the ex-ante level of output. The change in social 
welfare (dSW) is thus  given by G+F+E. Scenarios 2 and 3 can be represented similarly with 
the corresponding changes in perceived marginal revenue and marginal cost curves. 
 
3. Empirical Procedures 
 
The econometric model of industry equilibrium consists of the supply relation in equation [1] 
and the output demand function in equation [2]. In addition, three input demand equations 
(capital, labor and materials) are estimated to help identify the parameters in the marginal cost 
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function, as in Lopez, Azzam, and Lirón-España (2002). Income and time are used as demand 
shifters. The five-equation system was estimated using a non-linear, three-stage least squares 
procedure. The sample consists of annual data for the period 1972-1992 for 232 U.S. 
manufacturing industries at the 4-digit SIC level. The model was estimated separately for each 
industry in the sample and based upon these estimates, we calculated equilibrium values of 
 and Q  before and after a one-percent increase in the Herfindahl index and computed the 
ensuing welfare changes at mean values of 1972–1992. 
P
 
The next task is to empirically test the relationship between the impact of increased 
concentration on social welfare, dSW, and Z, a vector of exogenous variables which denote 
market structure, economies of size, and the price elasticity of demand. Since some of the 
same variables may influence more than one of these elements, we estimate the reduced 
form equation of the net impacts of Z on social welfare via regression analysis. We begin by 
identifying the key elements to be included as explanatory variables in Z. 
 
The first element is the level of concentration (H) which is the focus of this article. 
Ever since the seminal paper by Cowling and Waterson (1976) there has been a well-
established positive relation between industrial concentration and market power that yields 
higher prices under the assumption of constant marginal cost. However, increased 
concentration also affects social welfare through its impact on costs, reducing them when the 
industry faces economies of size and increasing them when the industry faces diseconomies 
of size. The interrelation of these elements renders unpredictable the a priori outcome of an 
increase in concentration on social welfare. 
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The 1992 merger guidelines of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) imply that 
the initial level of concentration could have a crucial impact on the balance of cost and market 
power effects. Accordingly, we expect further concentration from already high initial levels to 
have a negative impact on social welfare, while increased concentration beginning at lower 
levels is more likely to be beneficial. Thus, the Herfindahl index, H, is included as a regressor 
in the determinants of dSW in interaction with three dummy variables which replicate the FTC 
guidelines for low levels of concentration (Dlo for H<0.1), medium levels (Dme for 
0.1<H<0.18), and high levels of concentration (Dhi for H>0.18). 
 
The next element is the role of economies of size. To capture their impact, a dummy 
variable (Des) that takes the value of 1 for those industries with economies of size is included 
in Z. This variable is expected to have a positive effect on dSW as we anticipate concentration 
to foster cost efficiency in industries with economies of size. However, as shown by Harris 
(1988), economies of size can also act as entry barriers, thus amplifying the market power 
effects that could reduce welfare. 
 
Another element involves the determinants of the price elasticity of demand. An 
increase in the level of concentration increases market power, yielding higher prices and lower 
output which leads to welfare transfers from consumers to producers and consumption-related 
deadweight losses.  At the same time, this also leads to higher producer surpluses.  The lower 
the price elasticity of demand, however, the smaller the consumption-related deadweight 
losses and the more likely that further concentration will result in a net welfare gain. Therefore, 
we expect the social welfare effect of increased concentration to be positive the more price 
inelastic the demand function is. 
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The work of Pagoulatos and Sorensen (1986) indicates that industry concentration, 
the stage of production (consumer vs. industrial outlets), and the extent of new product 
introduction are key determinants of the variation of the own-price elasticity of demand across 
industries. Since concentration was already accounted for, an explanatory variable is added to 
the model: the percentage of products shipped to consumer outlets (CONS). Due to lack of 
data, the extent of new-product introduction is not included.  Since consumer goods tend to 
have a lower price elasticity of demand, we expect CONS to have a positive impact on dSW. 
 
Another element involves the role of trade in mitigating or enhancing market power 
and cost effects underlying welfare changes from concentration. As the works of Stahlhammer 
(1991) and Lopez and Lopez (2003) show, imports have a disciplining effect on domestic 
industries. One can thus expect the market power effect of concentration to be mitigated in 
industries facing import competition. For this reason import intensity (IMP, the ratio of imports 
to total sales) is expected to be positively related to dSW. 
 
Exporting offers firms a means of expanding the available market. Although exports 
are likely to have little impact on domestic market power (Pugel, 1980; Marvel, 1980), they can 
importantly affect the scale of operation, which could have an important impact on efficiency.  
Consistent with this argument are the conclusions of Lopez and Lopez (2003) who found that 
export intensity has a negative effect on the domestic Lerner index, possibly due to greater 
efficiency in capacity utilization that enhances cost efficiency rather than lower domestic 
market power per se. Since this would imply a positive effect of export intensity on domestic 
welfare changes, export intensity (the f.o.b. value of exports over domestic sales) is expected 
to have a positive effect on dSW. 
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Likewise, the size of the market matters. Previous work has found that in general, the 
larger the industry, the lower the markups (i.e. market power effect), but the higher the 
propensity to exploit economies of scale and to export (Holmes and Stevens, 2005; Melitz and 
Ottaviano, 2005; Weder, 2003). Thus, we expect a positive relationship between the domestic 
value of sales (VS) and dSW. 
 
In sum, Z= (H, Dlo, Dme, Dhi, Des, CONS, IMP, EXP, VS) is the vector of exogenous 
variables to be used in assessing the factors shaping the question whether or not further 
concentration is beneficial in U.S. manufacturing industries. Using a linear function of this 
relationship, the following regression equation is to be estimated across industries: 
 
iiiii
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vVSEXPIMPCONS
DesDhiDmeDloHdSW
+++++
++++=
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                             [4] 
 
where v is a random error, the ϕ 's are parameters to be estimated, and  is the social 
welfare change derived from a one-percent increase in concentration in industry i  as a 
percentage of sales. Other variables are as defined above. To gain additional insight, two 
additional regressions are performed on the components of dSW using the same explanatory 
variables: one for changes in consumer surplus as a percentage of sales (dCS) and another 
one for the changes in producer surplus as a percentage of sales (dPS). The equations are 
estimated correcting for dependent-variable heteroskedasticity.  All estimations are conducted 
with Shazam.  The results are presented in the following section. 
idSW
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4. Empirical Results 
 
Table 1 presents a summary of the results obtained from the estimations of market equilibrium 
for each industry. Detailed results for each industry along with information on how the data 
series were constructed are available from the authors upon request. The Lerner Index of U.S. 
manufacturing industries obtained an average value of 0.291, with a standard deviation of 
0.10, which indicates that the exertion of oligopolistic power is an extended practice 
throughout the industries in the sample. In terms of economies of size, 78% of the industries 
have cost elasticities less than one, indicating a widespread prevalence of economies of size 
that would translate into lower unit cost with higher concentration. The average value of the 
estimated own price elasticities is approximately -0.64, and almost 82 percent of the industries 
in the sample are price-inelastic. 
 
Table 2 indicates that although a one-percent rise in concentration in all industries 
would increase aggregate welfare in nearly 70% of the industries, consumers would lose in 
64% of the cases due to higher output prices. On the other hand, producer surplus would 
increase in 82% of the industries, mainly due to transfers from consumers caused by price 
increases (69%) while cost savings account for the remaining 31% of producer gains. 
 
Table 3 presents the estimates of the determinants of welfare changes from increased 
concentration. These results suggest that whether or not this process is beneficial depends 
strongly on the initial level of concentration. More specifically, greater concentration is 
beneficial for industries with initially low or moderate values of the Herfindahl index (H<0.18), 
possibly due to cost savings and improved allocative efficiencies in industries with weak or 
non-existing market power effects. However, further concentration in already highly 
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concentrated industries (H>0.18) leads to aggregate welfare losses, possibly due to allocative 
efficiency losses from enhanced market power effects that offset any welfare gains from cost 
efficiency. These results are consistent with the simulation results of Dickson and Yu (1989) 
that state that social welfare gains tend to be smaller the higher the degree of market power. 
 
Table 3 also shows that, regardless of the level of concentration, when industries with 
economies of size concentrate, there are social welfare gains, in accordance to the 
simulations of Dickson and Yu (1989).  The results for CONS also confirm our initial 
expectation that welfare gains tend to occur in industries with more inelastic demand functions 
since inelastic demands generate smaller consumer deadweight losses.  Table 3 moreover 
reveals that increases in concentration also tend to be beneficial in industries with high export 
intensity, which lends support to the hypothesis that further concentration enhances cost-
efficiency in export-oriented industries. However, the coefficient of the variable import intensity 
is not significantly different from zero, which weakens support for the hypothesis that imports 
discipline prices to the benefit of consumers in the face of further concentration. Finally, the 
coefficient of value of shipments indicates that concentration is likely to have a beneficial 
impact in larger industries rather than smaller ones, in consistency with previous findings that 
show that larger industries tend to charge smaller unit price-cost margins and that they are 
better able to exploit economics of size. 
 
Finally, the results in Table 3 show the impact of the explanatory variables on the 
changes in consumer and producer surpluses. It is interesting to point out that industrial 
concentration tends to be beneficial to both consumers and producers at low levels of 
concentration. For medium levels, further concentration harms consumers but benefits 
producers in a way that producers gain more than they offset consumer losses, which results 
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in a positive impact on social welfare. For high levels of concentration, however, consumer 
losses more than offset any producer gains resulting in a social welfare loss. 
 
The coefficients for the economies of size dummy and the percentage of consumer 
shipments are both positive for changes in consumer surplus and negative for changes in 
producer surplus. Given that economies of size implies output expansion with concentration, 
any expansion in output that derives from concentration will cause prices and revenues (or 
consumer expenditures) to drop, benefiting consumers but hurting industries. Most industries 
in the sample fall in this case (Table 2).  However, the final effect on producer surplus will also 
be mitigated by any cost savings and other explanatory variables. 
 
It is also interesting to note that import intensity has a beneficial impact on consumer 
welfare and a detrimental one on producer welfare as industries concentrate and that 
producer losses practically cancel any consumer gains, leading to a neutral impact of 
concentration on social welfare changes through import intensity. Export intensity has the 
opposite effect on welfare changes from concentration: it hurts consumers as industries 
concentrate since products are removed from domestic markets, but it is beneficial to 
producers since they can better exploit economies of size. Finally, the size of the market, as 
measured by domestic sales, follows a similar pattern as that of exports. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
When is concentration beneficial? Our results, based on a full model of industry equilibrium for 
a sample of 232 U.S. manufacturing industries, show that a one-percent across-the-board 
increase in the Herfindahl index would lead to welfare gains in 70% of the industries. More 
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specifically, social welfare gains occur mostly in industries with economies of size, inelastic 
demand, high export intensity, large size and low or moderate levels of initial concentration. 
Moreover, the impact of the explanatory variables on consumer surplus changes is generally 
in the opposite direction of the ensuing producer surplus changes from concentration, implying 
a trade-off, except for industries with low levels of concentration where further concentration 
benefits both consumers and producers. 
 
The results of this study thus lend support to the U.S. Federal Trade Commission 
guidelines (1992) that closely scrutinize mergers of highly-concentrated industries but 
generally allow mergers in low-concentration industries. Moreover, the Commission’s concern 
not only for the overall impact on net social welfare but also for the consequences of mergers 
for consumer welfare in particular is justified, because as this study shows, while 
concentration generally increases aggregate welfare, it also leads to higher prices as cost 
savings are usually not passed on to consumers. 
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Figure 1. Scenario 1: Output Price Decrease with Efficiency Gains
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Endnotes 
 
1 Recall that quantity is a function of price (via the demand function) and therefore of H via the 
pricing equation.  Thus, differentiating (1), one obtains 
 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +−−=∂
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=
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P
jj
m
j
βη
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1
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where L is the Lerner index.  Multiplying both sides by H/P one obtains equation (3): 
)(
2 ,, HCLHHP QHMC
MC εεηβε ++= , where HL,ε  and HC ,ε  are as defined in the text. 
 16
References 
 
Azzam, A. M (1997). “Measuring Market Power and Cost-Efficiency Effects of Industrial 
Concentration.” Journal of Industrial Economics 45, 377-386. 
Berger, A.N and T H. Hannan (1998). “The Efficiency Cost of Market Power in the Banking 
Industry. A Test of the quiet life and related hypotheses.” Review of Economics and 
Statistics 80, 454-465. 
Bian, L. and D.G. McFetridge (2000). “The Efficiencies Defense in Merger Cases: Implications 
of Alternative Standards.” Canadian Journal of Economics 33, 297-318. 
Blair, R.D. and J.L. Harrison (1999). “Antitrust: On the Cutting Edge.” Antitrust Bulletin 44, 1-3. 
Clarke, R. and S.W. Davies (1982). "Market Structure and Price-Cost Margins." 
Economica 49, 277-282. 
Cowling, K. and M. Waterson (1976). “”Price-Cost Margins and Market Structure.” Economica 
43, 267-274. 
Dickson, V. and W. Yu (1989). “Welfare Losses in Canadian Manufacturing under Alternative 
Oligopoly Regimes.” International Journal of Industrial Organization 7, 257-467. 
Dickson, V. and J He (1997). “Optimal Concentration and Deadweight Losses in Canadian 
Manufacturing” Review of Industrial Organization 12, 719-732. 
Feltovich, N (2001). “Mergers, Welfare, and Concentration: Results from a Model of 
Stackelberg-Cournot Oligopoly” Atlantic Economic Journal 29, 378-392.  
Focarelli, D. and F. Panetta (2003). “Are Mergers Beneficial to Consumers? Evidence from the 
Market for Bank Deposits”. American Economic Review 93, 1152-1172. 
Harris, F (1988). “Testable Competing Hypotheses from Structure-Performance Theory: 
Efficient Structure versus Market Power.” Journal of Industrial Economics 34, 267-
279. 
 17
 Holmes, T.J. and J.J. Stevens (2005). “Does Market Size Matter for the Pattern of Trade?” 
Journal of International Economics 65, 489-505. 
Lopez, R.A., A.M. Azzam, and C. Lirón-España (2002). “Market Power and/or Efficiency: A 
Structural Approach.” Review of Industrial Organization 20, 115-126. 
Lopez, R.A. and E. Lopez (2003). “The Impact of Imports on Price-Cost Margins: An Empirical 
Illustration.” Empirical Economics 28, 403-416. 
Marvel, H.P.(1980) "Foreign Trade and Domestic Competition."  Economic Inquiry 18, 103-
122. 
Melitz, M.J. and G.I.P. Ottaviano (2005). “Market Size, Trade and Productivity.” National 
Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 11393, Cambridge, MA. 
Pagoulatos and Sorensen (1986) “What Determines the Price Elasticity of Industry Demand? 
International Journal of Industrial Organization 4, 237-250. 
Pugel, T.A. (1980) "Foreign Trade and U.S. Market Performance." Journal of Industrial 
Economics 29, 119-129. 
Stahlhammer, N.O. (1991) “Domestic Market Power and Foreign Trade.” International Journal 
of Industrial Organization 9, 407-424. 
U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 
1992. 
Weder, R. (2003) “Comparative Home-Market Advantage: An Empirical Analysis of British and 
American Exports.” Review of World Economics/ Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 139, 220-
247.a
Williamson, O.E. (1968) “Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs.”  
American Economic Review 58, 18-36. 
 18
 
Table 1:  Summary of Estimates of Pricing Conduct and 
Economics of Size 
Number of Industries:                                     232 
Mean Value 
0.291 
Lerner Index 
Standard Deviation 
                                0.1 
Mean Value 
                                 0.94 
Positive 
                                    78% Economies of Size 
Negative 
                                   22% 
Mean Value 
                                 -0.64 
Inelastic 
                                  81.6% Price Elasticity of Demand 
Elastic 
                                  19.4% 
 
 
 
 
Table 2:  Welfare Effects of a 1% increase in the Herfindahl index 
Positive impact Negative impact 
Changes in: 
1992 $ Value 
(millions) 
Number of 
industries  % 
Number of 
industries  % 
Aggregate Welfare 463.4 162 70% 70 30% 
Consumer Surplus -986.2 83 36% 149 64% 
Producer Surplus 1499.9 191 82% 41 18% 
Changes in welfare  
as % of Total Value of Shipments Mean Value St. Deviation Lower Bound Upper Bound
Change in Aggregate Welfare 0.05 0.10 -0.26 0.52 
Change in Consumer Surplus -0.05 0.24 -1.09 0.99 
Change in Producer Surplus 0.10 0.18 -0.50 1.07 
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Table 3. Determinants of Welfare Changes from Concentration 
Aggregate welfare 
Change in: 
Consumer 
Surplus 
Producer 
Surplus  
(Standard Errors in parenthesis) 
Constant 
-0.17***
(-0.01)
-0.22*** 
(-0.01) 
0.12***
(0.008)
H x Low Concentration Dummy 
1.06***
(0.16)
0.53*** 
(0.03) 
0.18***
(0.03)
H x Medium Concentration Dummy 
0.66***
(0.08)
-0.44*** 
(0.03) 
0.97***
(0.11)
H x High Concentration Dummy 
-0.15***
(-0.03)
-0.62*** 
(-0.12) 
0.60***
(0.16)
Economies of Size Dummy 
0.20***
(0.009)
0.18*** 
(0.006) 
-0.04***
(0.006)
Consumer Shipments 
0.0003***
(0.0001)
0.001*** 
(0.00006) 
-0.0011***
(0.00007)
Import Intensity 
0.00005
(0.0001)
0.0002*** 
(0.00004) 
-0.0002***
(0.00002)
Export Intensity 
0.0006*
(0.0003)
-0.0009*** 
(0.00009) 
0.001***
(0.0002)
Domestic Sales 
0.0002***
(0.00003)
-0.0003*** 
(0.00002) 
0.0004***
(0.00004)
Notes: The levels of statistical significance 10%, 5% and 1% are represented by *, **, and ***, 
respectively. The regressions were corrected for heteroskedasticity.  
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